Overseas Civilian Contractors

News and issues relating to Civilian Contractors working Overseas

Undercounting Contractor Casualties in Iraq

by David Isenberg at Huffington Post  July 30, 2012

See Also Davids blog at the Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire

A new report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) provides some detail on the sacrifices made by private contractors who engaged in reconstruction or stabilization activities in Iraq between May 1, 2003, and August 31, 2010.

The total number includes 318 Americans (U.S. military, federal civilian employees, and U.S. civilian contractors), 111 third-country nationals, 271 Iraqis and 19 of unknown nationality who were working in support of the U.S. reconstruction or stabilization mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Of course, the actual total number, as opposed to the merely official one, is almost certainly higher, according to the report

For several reasons, an exact calculation is not possible. First, no agency managed a central database for reconstruction or stabilization casualties. Each U.S. government entity involved in Iraq’s reconstruction–the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)–maintained its own employee casualty database. The Department of Labor (DoL) maintains a database of civilian contractors of all nationalities that were killed in Iraq who worked for or were contracted by U.S.-based companies or were insured through U.S. insurance carriers and notified DoL through the Defense Base Act.
Second, the databases we could access often did not contain enough detail to confirm whether a casualty was stabilization- or reconstruction-related. For example, there were 1,047 military casualties where the type of mission could not be determined.

Finally, there was no central source of information on third-country nationals or Iraqi civilians killed while working on or in support of U.S. projects.

What the report, “The Human Toll Of Reconstruction Or Stabilization Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom” does say is that “Americans suffered 44 percent of the total reconstruction or stabilization-related deaths, including 264 from the Department of Defense (37 percent) and 54 U.S. federal civilian employees and U.S. civilian contractors (8 percent).” So, looking just at the very limited subset of contractors working stabilization and reconstruction-related activities, you get 57 deaths.

Please read the entire post here at Huffington Post

July 30, 2012 Posted by | Civilian Contractors, Contractor Casualties, Defense Base Act, Federal Workers, Government Contractor, SIGIR | , , , , , | Leave a comment

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Audit Report July 27, 2012

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL  FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

July 27

,http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-018.pdf#view=fit 2012
LETTER FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ

SUBJECT:         Status of Fiscal Years 2011-2012 Iraq Security Forces Fund (SIGIR 12-018)

July 27, 2012 Posted by | Iraq, SIGIR | , | Leave a comment

Iraq Reconstruction Effort Cost 719 Lives, Audit Finds

Bloomberg   Tony Capaccio  July 27,

At least 719 military personnel, civilian contractors, Iraqis and third-country nationals died inIraq over seven years performing U.S. reconstruction and stability operations, according to the first audit of its kind.

The dead include 264 of the 4,409 U.S. troops who died in Iraq from May 1, 2003, through August 30, 2010, according to the audit released today by Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The audit represents the first time a U.S. agency has attempted to tally the deaths associated with spending about $60 billion in congressionally appropriated reconstruction and stabilization funds.

Nothing was safe or “soft” about reconstruction missions, according to the report. “The human losses suffered in Iraq and outlined in this report underscore the point that when such operations are conducted in combat zones, they are dangerous for everyone involved,” the report said.

The deaths occurred during U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure, train police and security forces and restructure Iraq’s government institutions.

“The actual number of deaths related to reconstruction or stabilization activities is certainly higher than 719,”according to the report. “For several reasons, an exact calculation is not possible,” the report said, noting that no agency managed a central database for these categories of casualties.

Please read the entire story here

July 27, 2012 Posted by | Civilian Contractors, Contractor Casualties, Iraq, SIGIR, USACE | , , , , , , | Leave a comment

SIGIR Audit Finds Some U.S. CERP Funds Went to Insurgents in Iraq

Funds from a $4 billion program intended to improve relations between the two countries were siphoned off by the enemy, a new audit finds. Eli Lake reports on why CERP was still called a success.

 

A translator for the 3-89 Cavalry Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division (R) takes money from a U.S. soldier to give to the Sons of Iraq, a security group that was funded by the United States, on May 11, 2008 in Baghdad, Chris Hondros / Getty Images

Eli Lake at The Daily Beast   April 29, 2012

During the war in Iraq, battalion commanders were allocated packets of $100 bills and authorized to use them for anything from repairing a schoolhouse to paying off ex-rebels and paying blood money to the families of innocents killed by U.S. forces. But a new audit finds that in some cases that cash made its way to the pockets of the very insurgents the United States was trying to fight.

The money was part of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and from 2004 to 2011 the U.S. government poured $4 billion into it in Iraq. And because the Pentagon gauged CERP a success, a similar initiative is under way in Afghanistan. “We think CERP is an absolutely critical and flexible counterinsurgency tool,” Michele Flournoy, who was then undersecretary of defense for policy, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2010.

But was CERP really a success in Iraq? A 2012 audit conducted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and released to the public on Monday found that 76 percent of the battalion commanders surveyed believed at least some of the CERP funds had been lost to fraud and corruption. “Commanders sometimes perceived the corruption as simply a price of doing business in Iraqi culture and others perceived it as presenting a significant impediment to U.S. goals,” the report says. “Several asserted that reconstruction money may have ended up in the hands of insurgents.”

Please see the original and read the entire article here

April 30, 2012 Posted by | Uncategorized | , , , , , | Leave a comment

SIGAR April 30, 2012 Quarterly Report to the US Congress

SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Quarterly Report to the US Congress

April 30, 2012

Click here for PDF at SIGAR Site

April 30, 2012 Posted by | Afghanistan, Civilian Contractors, Contingency Contracting, Contractor Corruption, Contractor Oversight, Department of Defense, ISAF, Legal Jurisdictions, Private Military Contractors, Private Security Contractor, Safety and Security Issues, SIGAR | , , , | Leave a comment

SIGIR Reports: Hey, Anybody Know What Happened to the $2 Billion?

David Isenberg at The Huffington Post  February 6, 2012

See also at Davids Blog The PMC Observer

The latest Quarterly and Semiannual Report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was released January 30, 2012. What follows are relevant excerpts of some of the more noteworthy contractor related activities.

On December 21, a U.S. contractor was sentenced to 3 months confinement followed by 2 years of supervised release for lying to federal agents during the course of an investigation. The agents were investigating a fraud scheme involving the theft and resale of generators in Iraq to various entities, including the U.S. government. When he was initially interviewed in Iraq, he denied any involvement in the fraud scheme. The investigation demonstrated that he had in fact signed fraudulent U.S. documents and received money on several occasions for his part in the scheme.

As of December 31, 2011, the Defense and State departments and the US Agency for International Development had reported 88,380 contracting actions, projects, and grants, totaling $40.31 billion in cumulative obligation.

As of January 23, 2012, 15,154 employees of U.S.-funded contractors and grantees supported DoD, DoS, USAID, and other U.S. agencies in Iraq. The number of contractor employees declined by 72% since the end of last quarter, dropping from the 53,447 registered as of September 30, 2011.

As you would expect, now that the U.S. mission has been handed off to the State Department, the largest number of contractors, 9,228, are working for State, with 3,823 of those being American.

The second largest share is working for the U.S. Army, which has a total of 5,118 under contract, with 2,737 of the American.

One very interesting point comes towards the end, in the section on oversight. To appreciate this a little trip down memory lane is in order.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) — anyone remember Paul Bremer? — was established in May 2003 to provide for the temporary governance of Iraq. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 created the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and assigned the CPA full responsibility for managing it. The DFI comprised revenues from Iraqi oil and gas sales, certain remaining Oil for Food deposits, and repatriated national assets. It was used, in part, for Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts.

During its almost 14-month governance, the CPA had access to $20.7 billion in DFI funds and directed expenditures of about $14.1 billion. The CPA had $6.6 billion under its control when its mission ended on June 28, 2004. The Government of Iraq OI gave DoD access to about $3 billion of these funds to pay bills for contracts the CPA awarded prior to its dissolution.

Most of these funds were deposited into a DFI sub-account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) established for this purpose.

SIGIR initiated an audit to determine whether DoD properly accounted for its use of the $2.8 billion deposited into the DFI sub-account at the FRBNY after the CPA dissolved, and $217.7 million in cash that remained in the presidential palace vault when the CPA dissolved. Here is what it found:

DoD cannot account for about two-thirds of the approximately $3 billion in DFI funds made available to it by the GOI for making payments on contracts the CPA awarded prior to its dissolution.Most of these funds ($2.8 billion) were held in the DFI sub-account at the FRBNY; the remainder ($217.7 million) was held in the presidential palace vault in Baghdad. FRBNY records show that DoD made about $2.7 billion in payments from the DFI sub-account. However, the FRBNY does not have specifics about the payments or financial documents, such as vendor invoices, to support them. It required only written approval from the GOI to issue payment.

Although DoD had responsibility for maintaining documentation to support the full $2.7 billion in expenditures made from the FRBNY subaccount, it could provide SIGIR documentation to support only about $1 billion. Although DoD established internal processes and controls to report sub-account payments to the GOI, the bulk of the records are missing. As a result, SIGIR’s review was limited to the $1 billion in available records. SIGIR examined 15 payments from this group and found most of the key supporting financial documents.

Follow David Isenberg on Twitter: www.twitter.com/vanidan

February 6, 2012 Posted by | Civilian Contractors, Contractor Corruption, Contractor Oversight, Contractors Arrested, Department of Defense, Follow the Money, Iraq, Legal Jurisdictions, SIGIR | , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction January 2012 Quarterly Report

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

January 2012 Quarterly Report

Public Laws 108-106 and 95-452, as ammended

Quarterly Report and Semi-Annual Report to the United States Congress

Click here to see report

February 6, 2012 Posted by | Civilian Contractors, Contractor Oversight, Follow the Money, Government Contractor, SIGIR | , , , | Leave a comment

Dubai Firm Overbilled Pentagon $900 for $7 Part, Bowen Says

Bloomberg at SF Gate      July 31, 2011

A U.S. contractor in Iraq overbilled the Pentagon by at least $4.4 million for spare parts and equipment, including $900 for an electronic control switch valued at $7.05, according to a new audit.

Based on the questionable costs identified in a $300 million contract with Dubai-based Anham LLC, the U.S. should review all its contracts with the company in Iraq and Afghanistan, which total about $3.9 billion, said Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen.

“The audit found weak oversight in multiple areas that left the government vulnerable to improper overcharges,” Bowen wrote in the forward to his 30th quarterly report, released today. The contract in question was funded with a combination of money earmarked for Iraqi Security Forces and Army operations and maintenance funds.

Among the “egregious examples of overbilling” by Anham were $4,500 for a circuit breaker valued at $183.30, $3,000 for a $94.47 circuit breaker and $80 for a small segment of drain pipe valued at $1.41

Please read the entire article at SF Gate

July 31, 2011 Posted by | Contractor Corruption, Contractor Oversight, Iraq, SIGIR | , , , , | Leave a comment

Monitoring Responsibilities for Serious Incidents Involving Private Security Contractors Once U.S. Military Forces Leave Iraq Have Not Been Determined (SIGIR 11-019)

LETTER FOR SECRETARY OF STATE      July 29, 2011
                  U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
                  SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                  COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
                  COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES–IRAQ

Monitoring Responsibilities for Serious Incidents Involving Private Security  Contractors Once U.S. Military Forces Leave Iraq Have Not Been Determined     (SIGIR 11-019)

In September 2007, Blackwater, Inc., a private security contractor (PSC) under contract with the
Department of State (DoS), was involved in an incident that resulted in the death of 17 Iraqi
civilians.  As a result of the incident and its repercussions, the Department of Defense (DoD) and
DoS took actions to improve their coordination and oversight of PSCs involved in serious
incidents.1   In April 2009, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)

reported on the DoD system for reporting, investigating, and remediating serious incidents
involving PSCs in Iraq.2      Because of the planned withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq in

December 2011, SIGIR reviewed the U.S. government’s current and planned oversight of PSCs
in that country.  In April 2011, SIGIR reported on the relationship between the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers’ Gulf Region District’s reconstruction activities and its security contract
requirements with Aegis Defense Services, Limited.3

SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to determine (1) changes in the serious incident reporting
and investigating system since SIGIR’s 2009 report, (2) plans for the system after U.S. military
forces leave Iraq, and (3) coordination of serious incidents with the Government of Iraq (GOI).
SIGIR also followed up on the status of recommendations in its April 2009 report.  SIGIR will
be issuing separate reports on the current status of those recommendations.

SIGIR performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also
incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act
of 1978 and in furtherance of a mandate in Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for 2008, Public Law 110-181, pertaining to contracts for the performance of security and
reconstruction functions in Iraq.      SIGIR encountered significant constraints imposed by DoS’
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.  The Bureau was unresponsive to SIGIR’s requests for

1 According to DoD guidance a serious incident includes, but is not limited to, “any damage of equipment or injury

to persons, attacks, any weapons discharge, criminal acts, traffic accidents, incidents involving ISF [Iraqi Security
Forces] and any incident believed to have possible strategic or operational impact. Incidents where aggressive
personal behavior and share the road policies are violated shall be reported.”
2  Opportunities To Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating Serious Incidents Involving

Private Security Contractors in Iraq, SIGIR 09-019, 4/30/2009.
3  Gulf Region District Is Adjusting Its Aegis Security Contract Requirements for Changes in Reconstruction

Activities in Iraq, SIGIR 11-015, 4/27/2011.

July 31, 2011 Posted by | Civilian Contractors, Contractor Oversight, Iraq, Legal Jurisdictions, Private Security Contractor, SIGIR | , , , , | Leave a comment